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Dimitrios Dentsoras 
University of Manitoba 
 
Introduction 
Philosophers do not have much of a reputation for being practical people. Neither did 
they have any such reputation in the days of philosophy’s infancy, if we are to believe Plato’s 
anecdote from the life of Thales, the “first of the philosophers.” According to it, Thales once fell 
in a well while walking and gazing at the stars, earning the ridicule of a slave girl standing 
nearby.1 Plato also tells us that, in his own days, most people thought of philosophers as good-
for-nothings who could not take care of their own lives, let alone the lives of others.2 This is to a 
great extent a consequence of the multitude’s lack of philosophical understanding. But 
philosophers seem to have done quite a bit to earn popular disdain, by advancing the most 
outlandish views, and by focusing on the most impractical (and hopelessly irresolvable) 
questions. 
Yet, we also find out that ancient kings and emperors often brought philosophers with 
them while campaigning, and discussed with them a wide array of professional and very personal 
matters in times of peace.3 In fact, some of our finest surviving literature on moral philosophy 
can be found in treatises and letters, such as those of Epictetus and Seneca, which aimed at 
providing philosophical advice to well-educated philosophical laymen who found themselves in 
the midst of a personal crisis, usually caused by the loss of a beloved person, exile, or a 
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professional failure. This practical and personal aspect of philosophy, which had all but 
disappeared in the period since Marcus Aurelius, has been enjoying a survival in the form of 
philosophical practice, a discipline aiming at using philosophical reasoning in order to help 
people overcome a wide range of personal issues, from minor anxieties to the truly disruptive 
emotional outbreaks. Nevertheless, the majority of academic philosophical works, even those 
discussing so-called ‘practical ethics,’ still approach their subject from a detached theoretical 
standpoint, often not really expecting the reader to act out their recommendation – which is, after 
all, a theoretical conclusion. And even in cases where there is some concrete position on an 
existing moral or practical issue, the advice is most of the times general, not really addressing the 
specific needs of a specific person. This detached and generalizing feature of philosophy is what 
contemporary philosophical practitioners try to amend, modeling their methods and advice on 
the personalized practice of psychotherapy and counselling. 
This paper examines the genre of practical philosophical treatises in antiquity, contrasting 
it with contemporary literature in philosophical practice. Its main focus concerns the role of the 
philosopher as a guide to practical everyday concerns and the relationship between theoretical 
and practical ethics. An important question for ancient works on practical philosophy (and to a 
lesser extent their contemporary equivalents) has to do with whether, and to what extent, 
adopting the philosopher’s advice also requires an adoption of that person’s broader 
philosophical framework (Stoicism, Neoplatonism, Skepticism, etc.). Philosophers tend to put 
heavy emphasis on the existence of a broader philosophical theory that coheres logically with the 
practical advice a philosopher may offer. This emphasis is clearly reduced in contemporary 
works on practical philosophy. I discuss some evident advantages of the ancient philosophical 
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approach in connecting theoretical principles with practical advice, and conclude with some 
thoughts on how philosophers might write popular works on practical philosophy nowadays. 
 
 
Practical philosophy in antiquity 
Our ancient sources uniformly credit Socrates for being the first person to shift 
philosophical inquiry from contemplation of the physical world and its origin towards human 
nature and action. In this way, Socrates introduced the questions that would become central in 
moral philosophy. What is the ultimate purpose of human action? What kinds of actions are most 
profitable from a personal standpoint, and which for society as a whole? What are the benefits of 
morality? In asking these and other similar questions, Socrates did not merely aim at 
constructing a moral theory. Rather, as he proclaims in Plato’s Apology, the aim was to change 
the way in which his fellow Athenian citizens led their lives.4 Moreover, if are to believe some of 
Socrates’ followers, such as the historian and adventurer Xenophon, the scope of Socrates’ moral 
and practical interests were rather broad, ranging well beyond what a modern philosopher would 
consider ethics, to include advice about hygiene, household management, etc.5 But there was a 
unique element to Socrates’ approach to practical questions, which set him apart from sophists, 
orators, and politicians, rendering his advice and admonitions distinctly philosophical. This 
uniqueness of Socrates’ practical advice has to do with the primacy of rational argument. Rather 
than employing rhetorical strategies or appealing to established moral and religious beliefs, 
Socrates seems intent on offering practical advice by employing rational argument and little else.  
This strategy has two important consequences. On the one hand, it deepens the level of 
analysis to expose a bedrock of basic metaphysical, epistemological, and psychological 
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principles. Without taking any social moral conventions for granted, the moral and practical 
views of Socrates, and his future followers, had to be grounded on a foundational philosophical 
theory. Socrates, of course, never completed such a foundational work. But he did provide a 
number of insights, which led to the second consequence of his philosophical practical advice. 
This is the radical nature of the moral views and corresponding advice. Persistently, up until his 
final demise, Socrates confronted the Athenian populace, from the most illustrious to the most 
humble, and implored them to abandon their pursuit of money and fame in favour of a life of 
moral goodness and knowledge, primarily of their own selves.  
Socrates’ example, both as a philosopher and as a social critic and moralist, looms large 
in the philosophical schools that dominated the Hellenistic and Roman periods. Stoics, 
Epicureans, Platonists, and Pyrrhonian Skeptics engaged in a series of heated moral debates, 
presenting and defending a wide range of ethical views and practical advice. But they also shared 
some common conceptions regarding the purpose of philosophy and its connection to life. One 
such common conception had to do with philosophy’s goal. Rather than a merely theoretical 
enterprise, philosophy was seen by the Hellenistic schools as a “craft of life,” analogous to other 
crafts, such as medicine or carpentry, whose goal was to bring about the happy life, just as 
medicine and carpentry aim at restoring health or making a table.  
On the other hand, many of the Hellenistic schools saw philosophy as an intellectual 
discipline that demanded a long and challenging education.6 Rather than being open to the 
public, as Socrates’ impromptu discussions were, philosophy became an “academic” discipline 
under the Hellenistic schools. The promise of the schools was that a thorough philosophical 
training would not only provide one with some sort of practical knowledge, but would also 
prepare one for living a virtuous and fruitful – in other words, happy – life. In order for this to be 
 48 
 
achieved, one had to undergo instruction on a wide spectrum of philosophical questions, logical, 
metaphysical, psychological, etc.7 In the course of this instruction, the foundational tenets of 
each school were presented and defended. These included doctrines in physics (e.g. Stoic and 
Epicurean materialism), theology (e.g. the notion of Stoic divine providence), or psychology 
(e.g. the Platonic tripartition of the soul). In addition, membership in a Hellenistic school also 
required living a specified kind of life, with strict rules about practical matters, such as dietary 
habits, (e.g. Epicurean vegetarianism), or exercises aiming at eliminating emotions (in the case 
of the Stoics), or even beliefs (in the case of the Skeptics).8 
How did the Hellenistic philosophical schools relate to non-philosophers? Did they have 
any practical impact on their lives? Judging from the structure and operation of the philosophical 
schools, there seems to have been little concern with non-philosophers, or desire for making an 
impact on their lives. With only some exceptions, such as the public lectures of the Stoics, or the 
occasional member of the Cynics making an outrageous display of his anti-conventional morals 
in the streets of Athens, the Hellenistic philosophical schools were rather secluded. These seem 
to be two main reasons for this stark contrast between the extensive practical guidance for 
members of a school and the exclusion from public engagement. The first is the schools’ 
insistence on the wholesale adoption of their metaphysical, epistemological and moral doctrines. 
One could not be a Stoic with respect to moral theory without also being a metaphysical 
materialist and an epistemological dogmatist, for example. Related to this was the fact that study 
in the Hellenistic schools was a lengthy and rigorous process that did not offer much of a 
professional or social reward.  
To this, one had to add the fact that many of the Hellenistic schools also required 
adherence to strict practical and moral rules. The schools promised a happy life to their students, 
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but what they aimed at was their particular conception of happiness, and not at the happiness 
that the young men who entered the schools may have had in mind originally (professional 
success, public recognition, etc.). This is most clearly evident in cases such as Stoicism, which 
required the complete rejection of all emotions and proclaimed that one is condemned to live an 
utterly unhappy life until the final stage of apatheia can be reached.9 A similar all-or-nothing 
strategy was also adopted by the Skeptics, who proclaimed that a happy state of imperturbance 
(ataraxia) could only follow complete suspension of judgment.  
Given the evidently exclusive character of the philosophical schools and their stark 
rejection of popular morality and practises, it is rather surprising that philosophers enjoyed a 
high repute through the Hellenistic period and all the way up to the Roman imperial times. While 
philosophers remained politically insignificant,10 and were often treated as intellectual curiosities 
whose moral views should be taken with reservation,11 their presence in their higher social 
circles was considered an indication of, if not a requirement for, intellectual refinement. Part of 
philosophy’s popularity, no doubt, was due to the genius of Plato, Aristotle, and other popular 
philosophers whose books adorned  the shelves of bookstores in Athens.12 But a second, and 
perhaps more important, role was played by a gradual yet noticeable shift from the intellectually 
complex and almost impracticable doctrines of the Hellenistic schools towards a more common-
sense version of philosophical theories that offered achievable, and often personal, advice for 
real-life situations.  
The popularization of moral philosophy during the Roman period coincides to some 
extent with the rise of philosophical dilettantism and eclecticism. Rather than committing to a 
single philosophical school’s doctrines (including its metaphysical, epistemological, and moral 
tenets), well-educated Romans with a soft-spot for philosophical discourse felt free to construct 
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their own philosophical theories by combining the doctrines from each philosophical school that 
seemed most acceptable.13  Often, the more intellectually demanding parts of philosophical 
theories were left out, both because of their obscurity and also (and, perhaps, more importantly) 
because they did not have any clear application to practical questions that the philosophical 
dilettantes were mostly concerned with.  
Similarly, one notices a diluting of the practical demands that different philosophical 
theories make. Rather than insisting on the complete eradication of emotion that the Stoic 
Chrysippus demanded,14 later Stoics suggest a mere “lessening” of emotions, while still allowing 
for their existence. Similarly, the strict lifestyle of Epicureans was replaced with practical advice 
that focused more on enjoying pleasures than enduring pains with equanimity. Often, the 
arguments for this “light” practical advice were based on non-philosophical practical concerns, 
rather than logical coherence with basic metaphysical or moral beliefs. For example, Chrysippus 
prohibited mourning for the death of a beloved person on the basis of the fact that death is not an 
evil but rather something indifferent (which itself was a claim that followed from Stoic 
metaphysical and theological views). Later writers, on the other hand, accept that some mourning 
is acceptable and even appropriate, but point to the fact that it should never get out of control, to 
the extent of disrupting one’s life and psychological well-being.15  
A cursory look at the themes that dominate the moral treatises of the Roman period 
demonstrates a concern with practical issues that concern everyone, and not only philosophers. 
How to deal with death, both of those around me and – eventually – of myself? How can I 
combat anxiety and excessive ambition? How can I make friends and be liked by others? How 
can I make my life happier and more content? These are, of course, questions that earlier 
philosophers had also discussed. But in Roman times, their treatment takes a decisively personal 
 51 
 
tone. This is noticeable in the increased use of the moral epistle, which often addresses a 
personal misfortune, such as the death of a beloved person.16 Moreover, one notices an 
expanding use of rhetorical techniques that aim at helping non-philosophically trained people 
cope with all sorts of practical concerns, from the quotidian to the extraordinary.17 The success 
of the phenomenon of philosophical advice, in the Roman period, seems to have been 
considerable, leading to the expansion of the practice from philosophers, such as Seneca, to 
philosophically trained professionals, such as the orator Cicero, the historian Plutarch, or the 
doctors Galen and Sextus Empiricus.  
Given the never-ending popular need for advice and desire for help with personal 
difficulties, one may wonder what accounts for the popularity of practical philosophy, rather than 
some other kind of practical advice in antiquity. What weight did being a philosopher add in 
writing works on practical ethics? What did it bring to the table? Some answers to this question 
are given by Cicero, himself not a professional philosopher, but someone who was concerned 
with practical questions throughout his life and decided to devote the last part of his life to the 
study of philosophy.18 As Cicero notes, it is certainly not the fact that philosophers possess the 
truth about moral and practical matters that sets them apart. After all, the obvious difference of 
opinion among philosophers should be a clear indication that they do not possess a factual 
expertise the way that doctors and builders do. On the other hand, the moral and practical advice 
of philosophers, varied as it may be, is superior to that of others, for a number of reasons. The 
most evident is that philosophers have a comprehensive view of different moral opinions, unlike 
perhaps other specialists, and have devoted a long time to thinking seriously about moral and 
practical questions. Moreover, philosophers, and philosophers alone, validate their practical 
advice by placing it within a general moral framework, rather than taking for granted moral 
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beliefs from a variety of sources (laws and customs, popular beliefs, etc.), as other professionals 
do (clearly so, in the case of politicians and orators). 
The philosophical practical advice that Cicero and other thinkers of the Roman period 
offered was often tailored to the needs of an elite that was too busy or indolent to engage in 
lengthy metaphysical debates. In some cases the philosophical practical advice was accompanied 
by short summaries of the relevant philosophical positions, perhaps even a “suggested readings” 
list. Cicero, for example, supplements his practical advice and words of encouragement about 
dealing with the fear of death in his Tusculan disputations by presenting a survey of 
philosophical opinions on the nature of the soul, presumably with the thought that knowing what 
the soul is would give us a better idea on what the proper response to death is. But he does not 
insist on any particular psychological theory. Philosophical eclecticism, after all, would allow 
one to pick philosophical theories from any school, in order to come up with practical advice that 
often amounted to little more than common sense, combined with a watered-down version of 
some broad philosophical doctrines.   
Despite its popularity during the Roman period, philosophical practical advice was 
eventually replaced by a wholly new sort of practical guidance: Christianity. With the spread of 
the new faith, philosophy lost its claim to being “medicine of the soul”19 to a new set of soul-
doctors, namely Christian priests and saints. In many respects, the practical advice of the 
Christian priests did not differ much from that of pagan philosophical precursors. But 
Christianity offered, in addition, what philosophical advice had gradually renounced in the past 
centuries, namely a greater narrative and a foundational theory of the world. The Christian 
narrative did not possess, at least on the surface, the demanding complexity and sophistication of 
the Hellenistic philosophical theories, making it much more intelligible.  On this narrative of the 
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Creation, the Incarnation, and the Kingdom of Heaven (and all the episodes in between), 
Christianity built a nexus of practical advice and rules covering all aspects of human life. 
Practical advice and self-help today  
An ocean of technological, social, and intellectual developments separates us from the 
Roman aristocrats seeking philosophical advice, or from simple people of the Middle Ages 
asking their local priest for spiritual and practical guidance in dealing with the hardships of life. 
Yet very little has changed regarding the need for personal advice and guidance itself. If 
anything, the need seems ever-increasing, given the burgeonng, multibillion market for 
professional practical advice, from psychological counselling to self-help books. No longer the 
realm of religious guidance, our anxieties, challenges, insecurities, and overall bafflement about 
the meaning of it all, are open to a wide range of professionals and self-proclaimed experts, who 
are willing to offer their advice, and make a living from it.  
While a large part of the treatment of personal hardships and psychological conditions 
occurs within the regulated confines of modern-day “medicine of the soul”—psychotherapy--and 
its related disciplines, an ever-increasing number of people are seeking new, alternative, methods 
for dealing with life’s challenges, from the minor to the disruptive. This is testified by a 
ballooning market for self-help books, lectures, and workshops.20 In the case of self-
improvement books, two groups of authors dominate the field currently. One group is comprised 
of best-selling psychologists, who have adapted their academic research and made its main 
features available to (relatively well-educated) non-experts.21 Their works on popular science are 
mostly concerned with defending a particular psychological theory concerning the causes of 
anxieties and happiness.22 Some of these expert-written books present methods for dealing with 
one’s own difficulties (although they suggest that professional personal advice and help should 
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be sought, also). Others are more theoretical and avoid providing any concrete advice, focusing 
mostly on presenting a particular science-illuminated worldview. 
The second, and more successful in terms of readership, group of self-improvement 
authors is a heterogeneous collection of self-proclaimed experts and advisers, often people with a 
business and sales professional background, as well as spiritual gurus and advisers.23 Their books 
focus, as expected, on concrete practical advice about how to deal with a large array of personal 
challenges – challenges that, to some extent, everyone faces in their everyday life. These popular 
self-help books display significant variation in sophistication and concreteness. But some general 
features appear almost universally, defining to some extent the self-help book genre in the case 
of non-scientifically expert authors. 
One almost universal feature of such books is the frequent use of real-life examples, 
parallel to narrations of the authors’ personal experiences. The authors often advertise the fact 
that they are not ivy tower academics, and that their books are the product of actually having 
gone through the situations they describe (usually, an unhappy life that is turned around), or 
coming in contact with people that had such experiences.24 This strategy was also often 
employed by moral philosophers of the Roman period. But, while in the case of the Roman 
philosophers most examples are taken from the lives of illustrious public men, contemporary 
self-help authors mostly use examples of common people, with the obvious intention of 
convincing their readers that they could be just like the men and women who managed to turn 
their lives around.25 At the same time, self-help writers intermittently refer to examples of 
extremely successful people – primarily themselves – with the comment that the readers can also 
enjoy a similar success.26 
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In general, it would be fair to say that most of the advice offered in popular self-help 
books is really not much more than common sense. In fact, it is often presented precisely as 
being simple, rather than profound. But, when appropriately implemented, this common-sense 
advice is supposed to have impressive and even miraculous effects.27 Through repetitive 
observance of a few rules and basic ideas, usually in the form of oft-repeated slogans, the authors 
of self-help books promise that we will be able to face our anxieties and fears, feel better about 
ourselves, and be more successful in life.28  
At this point, one may ask what counts as being successful in life. The answer, usually 
given implicitly, is that success is defined by whatever one considers important. If money, love, 
and friends are what one wants, this is what following the author’s advice will help them acquire. 
If it is a quiet and peaceful life, the same advice can lead to this, too. After all, the advice is not 
about what one should want, but about how one could get what one happens to want. In this 
respect, contemporary self-help books differ significantly from much of the practical advice 
offered by philosophers in antiquity. Rather than adopting a radical moral position and 
prompting people to re-evaluate what they consider important in life, as Socrates did, 
contemporary self-help gurus merely propose ways in which people can get whatever they 
happen to want or make themselves feel better about what they happen to have. This, 
undoubtedly, seems rather selfish, and unabashedly so. But it does not differ much from the 
approach of psychotherapy, which aims primarily at making people feel better, rather than 
making them better people.  
 
Contemporary philosophical practice and counselling 
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To the two aforementioned categories of self-help books (those by psychologists and 
those by businessmen and gurus), one can add a third. This is the category of self-help books by 
philosophers. These are not theoretical books on practical ethics, but books modeled after 
psychotherapy, and aiming at providing guidance with respect to a variety of psychological 
challenges, from dealing with anxieties, to becoming happy, to finding meaning in one’s life.29 
The authors of these books refer to the discipline as philosophical practice or philosophical 
counselling.30 As philosophical practitioners often note,  the idea that philosophy could, and 
perhaps should, help people deal with everyday challenges, and provide meaning and direction in 
their lives, is almost as old as philosophy itself. And, in fact, quite a few recent works on 
philosophical practice have sought inspiration from ancient philosophers, such as Socrates, 
Aristotle, or the Stoics.31 But how do contemporary works on philosophical practice compare to 
ancient works on practical ethics? 
A look at the most popular books on philosophical practice, such as Lou Marinoff’s  
Plato, Not Prozac, reveals more similarities with contemporary self-improvement books than 
with the practical ethics of Roman writers, with the practical moral treatises of the Hellenistic 
schools remaining a distant relative. For the most part, works in philosophical practice defend no 
particular philosophical theory, but rather paste different ideas from very different theories, in a 
manner similar to the eclecticism of some Roman thinkers and amateur philosophers. 
Sometimes, works in philosophical practice provide short summaries of diverse philosophical 
positions, but make little out of the metaphysical and epistemological foundations of each 
theory.32 In most cases, the philosophical foundations are left out altogether, taking historical 
moral views as parting points, without providing any account of how they arose. Isolated quotes, 
rather than structured philosophical theories, is what the reader primarily receives.33  
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With respect to the philosophical advice offered, one notices a clear contrast between the 
radicalism of ancient practical ethics and contemporary philosophical counselling. While ancient 
philosophers focused on showing their readers that the goals they have set in life are gravely 
misdirected and could not be justified by philosophical reflection, contemporary philosophical 
counsellors do not challenge the general primary goals of their audience; rather, they aim at 
mitigating the effects that perceived personal failures have on the psychological well-being of its 
members. There are good practical reasons for this. It is hard to convince someone that money is 
completely unimportant and that the death of a beloved person should not be seen as a cause of 
unhappiness. It is much easier to simply try to make one’s readers feel less obsessed with 
amassing wealth or less depressed by personal misfortune, while admitting these are significant 
concerns. But, for the moral philosophers of antiquity, practical concerns took second place to 
portraying philosophical truth and constructing a rationally coherent system of beliefs. Socrates’ 
self-destructive insistence on this principle can only serve as a reminder to this. 
What can one say about the nature of the advice one can find in contemporary works on 
philosophical practice, then? To a large extent, philosophical practice works seem to be a blend 
of folk psychology and common sense, often reminiscent of other, non-philosophical self-
improvement books.34 The general idea they promote is that rational reflection on one’s life and 
a its level-headed re-evaluation can help with overcoming one’s problems. Philosophical practice 
is primarily forward-looking, offering advice on how to plan for and deal with the future, rather 
than overcoming past events. Rationally calculating our actions, philosophical practitioners 
maintain, has positive consequences.  This seems an obvious common-sense point that anyone 
should accept. But, what role does philosophy play in all this? Well, it depends on how one 
understands philosophy, the practitioners could reply. For some philosophical practitioners, 
 58 
 
philosophy seems to be a rather loose repository of ideas, pieces of wisdom that one can use in 
order to construct one’s own “philosophy” and make one’s life easier. The thread that holds it all 
together is critical reasoning, and this is what philosophy presumably supplies. 
Of course, this is not how academic philosophers understand philosophy. For most of 
them, philosophy is a discipline that aims at telling us something about the world, and not only 
an exercise in critical thinking that can be used as a tool for sorting out personal problems. 
Surely, the notion of philosophy as critical self-reflection figures prominently in ancient times – 
the call for common sense might not be that different from what Socrates tried to do when he 
urged Athenians to know themselves. But Socrates also had a broad theory in mind, which 
contained radical thoughts such as “it is better to suffer injustice than commit it.” One does not 
seem much of this is in contemporary works on philosophical practice. 
In conclusion, one could say that, despite the evident need for philosophical advice that 
reaches beyond academia and has an effect on the lives of common people, philosophical 
counselling still has a way to go towards becoming an established and effective discipline. The 
place of philosophical practice is clearly not as an antagonist to the scientific psychotherapeutic 
establishment.35 Its primary goal, rather, should be to demonstrate the need for a specifically 
philosophical rather than psychoanalytic or merely common sense approach to practical 
challenges. But what is a particularly philosophical approach? In answering this question, I 
believe we could take a lesson from the development of practical ethics in antiquity. The most 
important lesson, I think, is the need for a general philosophical theory, including basic 
metaphysical, epistemological, and moral doctrines that serve as the philosophical foundation of 
the proposed practical advice.36 Moreover, philosophical practice should provide some guidance 
with respect to the goals that one should have in life. Some of these general goals may well be 
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quite different from what is usually considered desirable. But this is in no way a discouraging or 
negative feature of philosophical practical advice. The spread of philosophy into the Roman 
upper classes in antiquity and the extraordinary appeal and influence of Christianity over the 
centuries only show that people need a narrative and a general worldview, as much as they need 
concrete guidance with respect to life’s daily challenges. Philosophical practitioners, and 
philosophers in general, could, and should, provide both. 
 
Endnotes 
                                                 
1 Plato, Theaetetus 174a. Aristotle paints a more complimentary portrait when narrating an 
anecdote of Thales’ entrepreneurial abilities in Politics 1259a.   
2 The image has been immortalized by Aristophanes in his comedy The Clouds, with Socrates 
playing the role of the practically inept philosopher. 
3 On this, see Elizabeth Rawson, “Roman Rulers and the Philosophic Adviser.” In Philosophia 
Togata: Essays on Philosophy and Roman Society, M. Griffin and J. Barnes, eds. (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1989). 
4 Aristotle proclaims a similar goal for his Nicomachean Ethics, at 1103b: “Our present inquiry 
does not aim, as our others do, at knowledge; for the purpose of our examination is not to know 
what virtue is, but to become good, since otherwise the inquiry would be of no use to us.” 
5 See, for example, Xenophon’s Socratic dialogue Oeconomicus (On household management). A 
similar breadth can, of course, be seen in the works of Aristotle.  
6 Not all the philosophical schools of the Hellenistic period were like this, however. Some, such 
as the Cynics, actually denounced all formal instruction. The Epicureans were also infamous for 
focusing almost exclusively on ethics, and only cursorily dealing with the other two main 
divisions of philosophy, logic and physics.   
7 Cf. the rigorous philosophical training that Plato requires from the future rulers of the state in 
the Republic. 
8 Some of these practices, such as the adoption of poverty by the Cynics (on this, see W. D. 
Desmond, The Greek Praise of Poverty: Origins of Ancient Cynicism (Notre Dame, IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2006)), or fasting by the Epicureans, also became Christian 
practices, at a later stage. For a revealing  treatment of  the influence that the Stoic theory of 
emotions and the related practices had on Christian thought and practice, see also Richard 
Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: from Stoic agitation to Christian temptation (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000). 
9 On Stoic apatheia, and the way one can progress towards it, see Margaret R. Graver, Stoicism 
and Emotion  (Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 2007). 
10 The relative political insignificance of philosophers had only a few exceptions. After Plato’s 
presumed failed attempt to establish a rule by philosophers in Sicily, philosophers remained 
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distanced from political matters in Greece. Some philosophers occupied somewhat important 
positions in the Roman imperial court (for example, Augustus’ adviser and Stoic philosopher 
Arius Didymus), culminating with the philosopher-emperor Marcus Aurelius.  
11 An example of such a response by Roman citizens can be seen in their reception of the 155 
B.C.E. Athenian delegation of philosophers, invited to showcase the Athenian philosophical 
schools.   
12 While our surviving works of Aristotle, the so-called “esoteric” works (commonly assumed to 
be lecture notes from Aristotle’s instruction at the Lyceum) are rather demanding and not 
particularly eloquent – certainly no material for a general audience – his published work intended 
for public circulation (the so-called “exoteric” works, of which little survives) was, apparently, 
much more approachable and stylistically polished. (Cicero, who had read the exoteric works, 
describes Aristotle’s prose as “rivers of gold” in Ac. Pr. 38.119.) Contrary to Aristotle’s lost 
exoteric works, Plato’s complete published works survive to our day. Of course, it would be hard 
to determine how popular Plato, Aristotle, and other philosopher were in antiquity (we certainly 
know that Plato and Aristotle were not the only popular philosophers, or even the most popular 
ones). But it is clear that there was a public demand for philosophical works.  
13 On eclecticism in ancient philosophy, see John Dillon and Anthony A. Long, The Question of 
“Eclecticism”: Studies in Later Greek Philosophy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1988). 
14 Chrysippus was particularly concerned with emotions and the attitude one should have 
towards them, writing four books about them, one of which, according to Galen’s De locis 
affectis 8.138, dealt with their therapy. On Chrysippus’ work On emotions and the claim that 
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